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Abstract 
Safety critical Systems often integrate multiple complex functions and must generally ensure safety. These 
requirements lead to a need for simulation system that provides a prototype system for evaluation. This article 
proposes an agent-based simulation framework to meet the challenges of designing and evaluating the performance of 
the safety critical system. The approach proposed represents each agent architecture including Agent communication 
interface, Reasoning, Modeling, domain knowledge set, Execution and human agent interface units. The agent maps 
the safety requirement using risk ordering. The whole simulation system composed of multiple agents. One case 
study shows that agent-based simulation can express the behavior and performance of the system as a whole, 
especially, safety attributes can be displayed. 
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1. Introduction  
In the real world, safety critical systems are being studied actively and extensively in both academia 
and industry because major failures lead to highly undesirable outcomes. After having realized such 
system, designers normally need to develop a prototype system for evaluation. Computer simulation is an 
attractive approach to evaluate real-world systems by means of imitating system operations numerically 
and computing various performance measures. A validated simulation system is a potentially valuable 
tool for comparing system alternatives. It is hard to build a simulation system that can represent the real 
system with the similar behavior or the attribution, especially, depict the safety attributes. 
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2. Challenges of Simulation  
Due to the considerable complexity and instantaneity in safety critical systems, their simulation models 
are absolutely intensive. A series of challenges which we have adapted to the realm of safety critical 
system must be met[1][2]. 
2.1. Precise representation of the real system 
A validated simulation system must properly model the real system. The simulation modeling can 
represent the structure, behavior and attribute of the actual system, especially, functionalities are 
introduced into the  model at each step that the integrated component reliably represents the part of the real 
system being modeled. 
2.2. Composability 
Each safety critical system almost is complex, designers always decompose the overall functions of the 
system into sub-functions in order to partition the search space for sub-systems and components .The 
whole system is a set of interacting composable components, which cooperatively achieve the overall 
system function. And therefore, composability is still a major subject in modeling and simulation. 
Although composability is taking more and more interest in modeling and simulation, its implementation is 
not without difficulties. 
2.3. Communication and coordination 
To accomplish a goal or adapt to changing circumstances in the environment, Communication and 
coordination is needed between the various simulation components. However, the availability of a system 
is so critical that having to stop it  even for a short time is unacceptable, and external environment is 
always changing. Simulation components must be capable of communicating and engaging in cooperative 
tasks in real time. 
2.4. Safety
There is the challenge associated with safety in the implementation process. Simulation must be 
consider the safety functions which  control the recognized hazards to achieve an acceptable level of risk 
and take the form of being protected from the event or from exposure to something that causes health or 
economical losses. So far it is difficult to express the safety attributes in simulation model. 
3. Agent Architecture Design 
Firstly, we will briefly introduce what is the component. A component is a software module that 
performs a defined task. Components, when combined with other software components, can constitute a 
more robust piece of software that is easily maintained and upgraded. Components interact with one 
another through various communication mechanisms. The agent architecture of safety critical system, We 
propose, is a highly component-based (modular) architecture[3]. 
Each component in our agent architecture can communicate information to/from all other components 
as needed through a communication mechanism including message format and message protocol. In order 
to facilitating the sharing of data/information among agents, we use a common agent communication 
1062  Zhu Yujun et al. / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 1060 – 1065 Zhu Yujun/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 3
language(ACL) encoded by XML as message format and simple TCP/IP sockets as the message protocol, 
because XML is  a standard for building tag-based documents and easy to generate, parse and edit. Fig. 1 
shows a model of the proposed Agent Architecture, it consists of five parts: Agent communication 
interface, Reasoning, Domain knowledge set, Modeling and State, Execution, Agent user interface. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The structure of an agent component 
3.1. Agent Communication Interface 
Agent communication interface is responsible for capturing and sending different messages between 
one agent and the agent’s environment through the communication network. It composed of input 
connector and output connector. Input connector monitors all or parts of the environment for the agent and 
for acting as an input port for receiving data/information for the agent from the environment to reasoning 
unit. Output connector sends data/information from execution unit to specific parts of the agent’s 
environment. Each connector has the message queue and may perform data conversions when necessary. 
The data/information includes source address, destination address, sequence number, time and contents 
represented by XML. 
3.2.   Reasoning 
The Agent Reasoning unit makes decisions and formulates goals for the agent. This unit reasons with 
information in its domain knowledge set as well as model and state to determine whether any actions need 
to be performed. In a general activity, the reasoning unit receives the message from input connector, and 
produce goals according to the useful information from other units, if necessary, it may change the state, 
then informs the execution unit to perform. 
3.3. Modeling  
The Modeling unit is the model manager for the agent. The model is a 4-tuple:M=（I,S,R,T）, where I 
is the set of component interface features. S is the set of agent states, here make a distinction between safe 
states and unsafe states. R is the ordering of states, according to risk. T is the set of transitions of states. 
I={Port1, Port2, Port3…Portn} represents detailed interface information of all connected ports with the 
agent, where  Porti=(name, type, connection_parameters,  Porttarget). 
S={ S1, S2, S3…Sn }is the set of agent states. 
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R=(S,Θ) describes the ordering relation on the set of states S, where Θ={﹤,≈,≤}. S1﹤S2is true if and 
only if the risk level of S1 is strictly lower than of S2, S1≈S2is true if and only if the risk levels of S1 and 
S2 are identical. S1≤S2 is true if and only if the risk level of S1 is less than, or equal to, the risk level of S2. 
If S1﹤S2,the transition S1 to S2 is safer than S2 to S1. 
T=S×S×L, S being the set of states and L is the set of labels. Given t∈T, t=(m, n, l) is a transition, 
source(t)=m and target(t)=n denoted, respectively, the source and target states of t. The form of  labels L: 
e/a[q, p). e is a triggering event, a is an action event, [q, p) is a real-time constraint on a transition t and 
imposes the condition that t does not execute until at least q time units have elapsed since it most recently 
became enabled and must execute strictly within p time units[4].  
3.4. Domain Knowledge Set 
The domain knowledge set stores safety procedures, operational experience and some essential data, 
and may provide an alternative step, solution or data to be considered by the agent. It can be continuously 
updated by either an agent itself or a system designer. This unit helps Reasoning unit set a goal by 
providing knowledge support, meanwhile, it can get more cognitive during this course and update some 
knowledge itself. Domain knowledge set, generally, has a table about the relation with other agents and 
points out the congruent relationship of attributes and other agent. When the attribute is changed or is used, 
the agent need inform the other one who also has the same attribute. The form of  table is described in 
table1. Synchronization number maintains the same version of attributes among all the agents. Related 
agents must be given the update message when the attributes are changed or used. 
Table 1 The relation table of Attributes and Related Agents 
Synchronization Number Attributes Related Agents 
5 A1 Agent4,Agent6 
10 A3 Agent7 
2 A2 Agent3,Agent8 
… … … 
3.5. Execution
The Execution unit operates by executing the goals developed by the Reasoning unit. An executable 
step contains preconditions, an action and possible post-conditions. If the pre-conditions are met, the action 
is executed. When execution is finished, the post-conditions are evaluated, and a completion status is 
generated for that step. In general, the agent will certainly communicate with the the agent’s environment 
during this process. 
4.  Case study for agent-based simulation 
A motivation example is the railway signal system illustrated in Fig.2. It need to develop a prototype 
system for evaluating the interlocking system that controls the routes, switches and signals, We can build a 
simulation system within a multi-agent environment. Railway line, in our model, is basically composed of 
tracks(T1,T2,T3,T4) and signal lamps(L1,L2,L3). Signal lamps have two  basic aspects, namely red and  
green, to represent proceeding an nonproceeding aspects respectively. A route is defined as a path between 
two signal lamps in the same direction, for example,L1 and L2 can make up a route R1 including three 
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tracks T1,T2 and T3,see Fig.2(a), L1 and L3 also can make up a route R2 including three tracks T1,T2 and 
T4,see Fig.2(b). White line represents a route[5]. 
 
                                        
Fig 2. (a) the route R1; (b) the route R2. 
We select the route R1 as an example to build the agent model named Agent1. There are three states of 
Agent1,S={Set, Cancel, Fault}.The risk ordering is Cancel≤ Set, Set<Fault, .It can be get from Fig2 and 
Fig3 that T2 has a switch, therefore, T2 is either a section of route R1 or route R2.Agent1 should keep the 
domain information shown in table2. 
Table 2 The relation table of Agent1 
Synchronization Number Attributes Related Agents 
1 {T2: anti-position} Agent2 
 
The transition of Agent1 is depicted in Fig 3. 
 
Fig 3. The transition of Agent1 
When the interface get the message to build the route R1 from the interlocking system or the user 
clicking the lamp L1 , it informs the  reasoning unit to formulate goals. The reasoning unit first requests 
domain knowledge set and gets the information about T2 has relevance to Agent2, it asks  Agent2 for the 
information of T2.Then the reasoning unit produces a safe goal according to the state and risk ordering 
information from the model and sends the goal to the execution unit. in consideration of safety factor, the 
final goal is different from the initial purpose. The user wants to build a route, but Agent estimates that a 
lamp fails and formulates the goal about changing the state to fault. The working process of Agent1 is 
shown in Fig 4. The running time of process is shorter than the time required, see Fig 7. 
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Fig 6. The working process of Agent1 
 
Fig 7. Runtime of real time and demand time 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has introduced an agent-based simulation framework for safety critical system.The idea is to 
use the agent to model the physical and logical components of a safety critical system. The agent-based 
system showed very similar behavior and performance with the real system, it is confirmed in the 
experiment. The whole simulation system can be achieved by integrating the agent components into a 
multi-agent system. The way of building the model and the introduction of risk ordering, particularly, 
help maintain the safety property. This framework will play a useful role in the simulation field of safety 
critical system. 
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